EDMUND HUSSERL'S CONCEPTION OF MAN
Konsepsi Manusia Menurut Edmund Husserl

¹YICHENG HE
¹*MOHD SYAHMIR ALIAS

¹School of Humanities, Universiti Sains Malaysia,

11800 USM, Pulau Pinang.
*Corresponding author: syahmir@usm.my
heyc2021@student.usm.my

Abstract Edmund Husserl's exploration of the concept of man through phenomenology forms the basis of this study. Husserl posits that man, as an intentional being, constructs both the external and internal worlds through intentionality, leading to what he terms a "structural existence." This study addresses the problem that, although science often attempts to eliminate subjectivity, Husserl emphasizes that man's subjective value remains fundamental. The objective is to investigate Husserl's views on how man not only gives meaning to the world but also retains irreplaceable subjective experience and value, even in an inter-subjective lifeworld where interactions with others shape objectivity. The research employs a combination of library research and textual analysis to collect and analyze data from various sources. These methods enable a thorough examination of Husserl's ideas and the identification of patterns and themes within the philosophical texts studied. Findings reveal that man is not an isolated entity but a living, physical being whose existence is intertwined with the world and others through emotional and practical engagement in the inter-subjective lifeworld. This engagement continuously shapes the meaning of self and the world. This study implies that Husserl's phenomenological approach highlights the importance of human subjectivity and inter-subjectivity as foundations for understanding both personal existence and objective reality.

Keywords: Edmund Husserl, man, intentionality, phenomenology, philosophy of human person.

INTRODUCTION

Edmund Husserl is a well-known philosopher who inaugurates phenomenology in the 20th century. It is argued by him that there must be a novel approach that brings a theory to philosophize phenomenologically the structure of consciousness (Husserl, 2001). This way of philosophizing aims at the exploration of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity and identification of the origins of knowledge in contrast of traditional epistemology, with the criticism towards psychologism or positivism. Moran (2002, p. 4) said: "Phenomenology is best understood as a radical, anti-traditional style of philosophizing, which emphasizes the attempt to get to the truth of matters, to describe phenomena, in the broadest sense as whatever appears in the manner in which it appears, that is as it manifests itself to consciousness, to the experiencer." Even though there is not too much clear discussion on conception of man which can be found in Husserl's phenomenological works, there are many hints and related sayings in those works which can be inspected and be extracted for following narration and summaries of Husserl's viewpoints on that conception. After all, both the experience of consciousness and the structure of consciousness, which are analyzed phenomenologically by Husserl, belong to the characteristics and attributes of a man. Both is one of parts of one's senses and mind for a man. To explore the related issues from phenomenologists are based on a man's experiencing, thinking, and knowing. Therefore, it is possible to make summaries and narratives of the concept of man from Husserl's phenomenological works, although there are not too many clear or straightforward statements about the concept in these works.

It is also essential to explain what the conception of man refers to before the discussion on Husserl's ideas about it, because this phrase is too common to be regarded as some certain cliché: there are some universal and essential characteristics behind human nature, or there are any essences which can be found in a man, or there is a clear linguistic outline or boundary of the concept of man. For instance, it is deemed by Stoics that the nature of a man lies in his reason instead of his worldly body. Epictetus (1925, p. 9) said, "The reasoning faculty; for this is the only one we have inherited which will take knowledge both of itself—what it is, and of what it is capable,

and how valuable a gift it is to us—and likewise of all the other faculties." This is a classical school of view on the nature of man in the history of philosophy, which assumes a fundamental point that there are some vital factors behind the phenomena of being human. For other schools on this question, there may be some points in favors of other factors than reason as the nature of man, but the basic position still lies in a presupposition, a kind of essentialism, that there are some crucial and universal attributes behind man. However, there is a difference between the phenomenological position and the essentialist one. This is because that the dictum of phenomenology is "to the things themselves" (Zahavi, 2019).

Phenomenologists argue that, as an alternative approach, phenomenology is inclined to examine the various lived experiences and phenomena related to an object, rather than focusing on abstract conceptualizations of the object that are conditioned by certain linguistic fields or theoretical frameworks (Moran, 2002). An object may present different facets and perspectives when one observes and experiences it through different viewing angles. The experience of objects which is experienced by consciousness is focused by phenomenologists and is divided as several types, such as perception, image consciousness, phantasy, memory, thought, and so on (Walter Hopp, 2020). Through this perspective, an object would not only be regarded as something confined by specific conceptualization, but also be seen as something experienced in the sense of living through or performing it. This first-person or subjective quality—the felt sense of undergoing an experience—is a fundamental part of the very nature and structure of conscious experiences themselves. When one says, "I see", "I think", "I desire", or "I do", we are referring to this lived, felt character that is interwoven into the fabric of the experience itself. This experiential feature has both a phenomenological dimension, being part of what defines the experience as an experience, as well as an ontological dimension, being part of what makes the experience genuinely real and existent. Therefore, the notion of a "conception of man" in the following texts does not pertain to a fixed object confined by rigid linguistic boundaries, but rather encompasses a dynamic interplay of expressions and ideas about characteristics of man.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Husserl's thoughts, especially his research on the concept of human beings, had a profound impact on the development of philosophy in the 20th century. Many scholars have conducted in-depth research on Husserl's concept of man from different angles. Building on the foundation laid by James Edie's efforts in the early 1970s through Northwestern University Press's "Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy" series, which provided English-speaking readers with crucial access to Husserl's thought, a new wave of outstanding Husserl scholarship emerged. This work by Edie set the stage for subsequent Husserl research and stands as an exemplary of professional leadership (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 1964). Following this groundwork, a group of distinguished scholars conducted in-depth studies of Husserl's ideas. The works of Mohanty (1969), Sokolowski (1970), and others have been characterized as "critical interpretations," each focusing on different aspects of Husserl's thought. Notable contributions to the research on Husserl's concept of the person include Mohanty's (1969) Edmund *Husserl's Theory of Meaning* and Sokolowski's (1970) *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*.

These studies have significantly advanced our understanding of Husserl's philosophical ideas, particularly his conception of human beings and consciousness. Researchers have realized that to fully understand Husserl's views on the concept of human being, it is necessary to trace back to Brentano's influence, especially in the theory of intentionality. Scholars have noticed that Husserl's understanding of the concept of man has undergone a development process. For example, after 1894, Husserl changed his views on some key points. They pay particular attention to the importance of Husserl's phenomenological reduction method in understanding human nature. Through this method, Husserl tried to reveal the essential characteristics of human consciousness structure. However, there are not enough studies specifically focusing on this topic, and the relevant discussions are not focused enough. The study of the Husserlian concept is a continuously developing field. With the compilation and publication of more manuscripts and the emergence of new interpretation perspectives, it is necessary to conduct more in-depth research on Husserl's

understanding of human nature, consciousness structure, subjectivity and other aspects (Sokolowski, 1970).

As for philosophical research on the nature of man, in recent years it has remained a hot topic, and scholars have conducted in-depth discussions on this topic from different perspectives. In general, these studies have shown a diversified trend, with both the inheritance and development of traditional views and the introduction of new theoretical perspectives. Especially, in recent years, anti-essentialist viewpoints have gradually come to the fore, such as Kronfeldner's (2018) *What's Left of Human Nature.* Despite their anti-essentialist tendencies, some scholars still view the issue of human nature from a humanistic perspective, such as Roger Scruton, who suggests that the study of human nature needs to consider the relationship between science, value judgments and social policies. Relying solely on science may not be able to fully support value judgments, and everyone needs some theory of human nature or philosophy of life. Even skeptics cannot completely avoid providing reasons for their beliefs and behaviors (Scruton, 2017).

Some scholars have emphasized the central position of the concept of human nature in traditional philosophical research. Stuart Hampshire (1965) pointed out that the concept of man is the core of philosophical discussion and the basis for the establishment of other controversial concepts. He believes that philosophy itself can be described as an exploration of the "definition of man," and great philosophers in the past have tried to give different explanations of the power of human nature. This view echoes the position of phenomenology to some extent, that is, taking human subjectivity as the starting point of philosophical reflection. However, Hampshire (1965) also recognizes that in the contemporary context, it is difficult for us to give a definite definition of human nature.

On the contrary, the description of human nature is more of a "reasonable suggestion" derived from the philosophy of mind, an "opinion" rather than an "argument". This view reflects the critical attitude of contemporary philosophy towards essentialism and is also consistent with the methodology of phenomenology that emphasizes empirical description

rather than *a priori* reasoning. Rosen (1997) proposed a new way of thinking to "found" philosophy through human nature. He believed that philosophy is not a set of doctrines or methods, but a reflexive state of knowledge and love of the human soul. This love comes from outside of us, as if struck by the god of love from above. He further pointed out that the sacred love of knowledge is the prerequisite for acquiring all knowledge and the driving force of all exploration. Although Rosen's views are different from traditional phenomenology, they also emphasize the importance of subjective experience in philosophical thinking.

Some scholars have shown anti-essentialist viewpoints, such as Kronfeldner (2018). She rejects the traditional essentialist notion that human beings have a fixed, eternal essence. She contends that human nature should no longer be seen as an "essence" but should be understood in a post-essentialist way that does not rely on any fixed core qualities. She proposes the concept that human nature should be understood as pluralistic. Based on different classification, description and explanatory functions, science can understand and define human nature in different ways without being limited to a single definition. This diverse perspective enables better responses to various challenges in science. Kronfeldner (2018) emphasizes that human nature is formed through the interactive process of nature and culture. This interaction occurs not only during individual growth and development, but also unfolds at evolutionary and social levels. She argued that culture and environment interact closely with natural factors to shape human traits and behavior. understand and define human nature without being limited to a single definition. This diverse perspective enables better responses to various challenges in science.

From a methodological perspective, Midgley (1978) made a strong defense of the concept of human nature in her book Beast and Man and expressed critical sympathy for the work of anthropologists such as Eibl-Eibesfeldt. Midgley's work reflects the trend of cross-integration between contemporary philosophy and other disciplines, such as anthropology and biology. In addition, some scholars focus on studying the concept of human nature of specific thinkers or specific periods. For instance, Christopher Berry (1986) studied Hume and Hegel's view of human nature and others

studied Marx's view of human nature Aristotle's view of human nature (2018). These studies not only enrich our understanding of specific thinkers, but also provide a historical dimension for us to think about the issue of human nature. In the book *Thirteen Theories of Human Nature*, Stevenson, Haberman, Wright and Witt (2018) systematically sort out and analyze the main Western theories of human nature. First, they reviewed the historical evolution of human nature theory. From the rationalist view of human nature of ancient Greek Plato and Aristotle to modern Kant's rationality and free will, Marx's social determinism, Nietzsche and Sartre's existential view of human nature, etc., it expounds the views of philosophers on human nature in different periods. The authors also provide a detailed interpretation of the theories of human nature in major Eastern and Western religious traditions. Including the Confucian "benevolence" view of human nature, the Hindu "Brahman and I are the same" theory of the identity of man and self, the Buddhist theory of "no-self" and "karma", the Christian "theistic" view of human nature, the Islamic "Caliphate" ideal, etc. It reflects different cultures' interpretation of human beings. Under the influence of Darwin's theory of evolution, the author discusses the interpretation of human nature by social Darwinism and evolutionary psychology, as well as the reflections and challenges of behaviorism and cultural anthropology. It focuses on the analysis of the view that "gene-culture" dually determines human nature. They also discuss the practical guiding significance of human nature theory to individual development, ethics, social systems and other aspects, such as feminist theory reflecting on the limitations of human nature theory that excludes women from a gender perspective (Stevenson et al., 2018).

From a more macro perspective, some scholars try to explore the characteristics of a certain era or trend of thought through the concept of human nature. For example, Gaus (1982) studied the view of human nature in modern liberalism. These studies help us understand the changes in the concept of human nature in different historical contexts. In his book *The Ascent of Man: A Philosophy of Human Nature*, Harris (2012) attempted to develop a general theory of human nature. He explicitly stated that this work was a philosophical response to Darwin's *The Descent of Man*. Harris's work reflects the efforts of contemporary philosophy to incorporate an evolutionary perspective into discussions of human nature.

Overall, philosophical research on the nature of human beings has shown diversified and interdisciplinary characteristics in recent years. Scholars have inherited the problem consciousness of traditional philosophy and introduced new theoretical perspectives and methods. Although the exact definition of human nature remains controversial, researchers generally recognize the core position of the concept of human nature in philosophical thinking. These studies provide us with rich ideas for understanding the nature of human beings and provide space for dialogue and development for specific philosophical schools such as phenomenology.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research method used in the article combines library research and textual analysis. The purpose of this research method is to collect and analyze relevant information from a variety of sources to address the research question being studied. Library research methods are used to collect research information. This involves conducting a comprehensive literature search to find books, journals, and other sources related to the research topic. The sources are then evaluated for relevance, credibility, and reliability, and the information is organized and synthesized in a systematic way (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). In this study, given the focus on Husserl's conception of man, his perspectives are indispensable, making a detailed examination of his works essential. To thoroughly explore his views, we analyze key sections from several of his seminal texts, including *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (Husserl, 1970), *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* (Husserl, 1989), *Logical Investigations* (Husserl, 2001), and *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (Husserl, 2014). These works provide a comprehensive foundation for understanding Husserl's philosophical framework regarding human existence and intentionality.

In addition to library research, textual analysis plays a pivotal role in systematically examining the information gathered. According to McKee (2003), textual analysis is a method used to carefully interpret and

dissect written texts, focusing on identifying recurring patterns, themes, and underlying relationships within the content. In this study, textual analysis becomes a critical tool for engaging deeply with Husserl's philosophical writings. It can meticulously examine Husserl's texts to uncover the nuances of his ideas about the nature of human beings within the broader framework of phenomenology. By systematically analyzing Husserl's works using the textual analysis approach, patterns and structures in his philosophical discourse on man can be uncovered. This method is essential for interpreting complex philosophical language and ideas, such as Husserl's notions of consciousness, intentionality, and the lived experience. By engaging with the texts in this way, it is useful in uncovering implicit meanings and context within the texts, providing insights that go beyond surface-level interpretations.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Intentionality of Man

When it comes to the conception of man of Husserl, it is needed to mention that one of most significant concepts in his phenomenology, i.e., intentionality. This is a technical term instead of referring to one's willingness to achieve something or reach a goal. Sokolowski (2000, p. 8) said, "We have to make the adjustment and understand the word to mean primarily mental or cognitive, and not practical, intentions. In phenomenology, 'intending' means the conscious relationship we have to an object." This is a kind of attribute that a group of experiences which are all characterized by being conscious of something, that is which refers to experiences of something. In other words, intentionality is a characteristic of the relationship between subject and object in the process of cognition. The relation implies that there is no absolute separation of the mind or consciousness from the outside world. The consciousness cannot be likened to a container which is contactless to the outside world. Instead, it should be regarded as continuous existence with the outside object and the world. The experience of consciousness is directed toward an object by virtue of its contents or meanings. The relation as a structure of consciousness is the intentionality. Husserl aims to capture the essence of our lived experiences

from the subjective viewpoint of the individual. When one perceives a decaying oak, for instance, the intricate neurological processes happening within one's brain remain outside the realm of my immediate awareness (Zahavi, p. 2003).

At the beginning of the 20th century, Husserl argued that there had been a crisis of science in Europe. Objectivism and related research paradigms seemed to have been so successful that they had made the believers involved less concerned with the sources of knowledge, philosophical foundations and paradigmatic legitimacy of science, and had turned to a blind faith in the primacy of technology. Science has been distinguished from philosophy and ethics, and facts have been separated from values. And one way to resolve the crisis in science, according to Husserl (1970), is to take a thorough look at the dominant objectivist's research paradigm. And the result of that scrutiny was the birth of phenomenology. And intentionality reveals the illusion that only a scientific account can grasp the external real, as well as critiquing the associated independence from our empirical and conceptual perspectives.

As per Husserl's (1970) phenomenological analysis, every intentional experience can be examined from three distinct vantage points or dimensions. One can direct attention towards the subjective mental process itself, scrutinizing the inherent, real content that constitutes the act. Alternatively, one can analyze the signification or meaning imbued within the experience, thereby probing its intentional content. Finally, one can shift focus onto that which is intended, that is, the intentional object towards which the act of consciousness points. In essence, it is the intentional content that bestows intentionality upon consciousness, endowing the act with its directedness toward something. The intentional content constitutes the meaning or sense through which the conscious act intends its object. Moreover, phenomenology emphasizes that this intentional meaning is not constructed in a purely immanent way but arises from our being-in-the-world and situated engagement with the phenomena themselves.

Every intentional experience manifest as a specific modal type—whether it is an experience of hoping, desiring, reminiscing, affirming, doubting, fearing, or the like. Husserl termed this particular character of the experience as its "intentional quality". Simultaneously, every intentional experience is oriented towards something, it concerns or is about some object or state of affairs, be it an experience pertaining to a deer, a cat, or a mathematical truth. Husserl designated the component that specifies the experience's object or subject matter as the "intentional matter". Moreover, the intentional quality and intentional matter are inextricably intertwined, jointly shaping the meaning and directedness of the experience. Husserl (2001, p. 121) said, "Quality only determines whether what is already presented in definite fashion is intentionality present at wished, asked, posited in judgement etc. The matter, therefore, must be that element in an act which first gives it reference to an object, and reference so wholly definite that it not merely fixes the object meant in a general way, but also the precise way in which it is meant." Phenomenology underscores that these dimensions are not abstract categories but arise from our lived, contextual engagement with the world around us.

Moreover, for a classical correspondence theory of truth, Husserl proposed the notion of "evidence" in an attempt to understand knowledge and judgment on the basis a model of fulfillment (Husserl, 2001). He argues that knowledge can be characterized as an identification or synthesis between that which is intended and that which is given, and that knowledge can be characterized as an identification or synthesis between that which is intended and that which is give, and truth as an identity between the meant and the given. The notion under discussion departs from a classical correspondence theory of truth, as the coincidence in question is not between two distinct ontological realms, but rather a coincidence between two intentions or intentional acts. We are addressing an agreement or synthesis between the intending mental act and its intended object within the unitary correlational structure of intentionality. Furthermore, phenomenology asserts that this coincidence or fulfillment is not a static state, but a dynamic, temporal process involving protection, retentions, and ever-shifting meaning horizons. The intentional act itself shapes and constitutes the appearance of the object through its meaningful directedness.

As mentioned before, intentionality is a crucial term for access to phenomenology and is characterized as a significant method for the exploration of the relationship between soul and the outside world. It represents a novel paradigm of understanding cognitive experience as an alternative of classical epistemology, which prerequisites the soul as a container lacking direct contact with the outside, so that there is an absolute distinction between the soul and the world in sense of epistemology. By contrast, phenomenologists deem that, "Not only can we think of the things given to us in experience; we can also understand ourselves as thinking them. Phenomenology is precisely this sort of understanding: phenomenology is reason's self-discovery in the presence of intelligible objects" (Sokolowski, 2000, p. 4). In other words, phenomenology attempts to explore the principles behind the direct relation between soul and outside world in the sense of cognitive experience. Consequently, Smith (2013) proposed: "The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object." Therefore, intentionality can be regarded as a bridge that is applied for linking the soul with the outside world.

The bridge, which is constructed for re-understanding the relation between the soul and the world, is so important to identify the conception of man. This is because in the long history of philosophy there has been a crisis of modernity at the cultural and philosophical ideas. As Pippin (1999, p. 2) said, "Within the arts at least, and among some philosophers, it is, after all, not news that what some regard as the great achievements of European modernity, such things as an urban, cosmopolitan civilization, material prosperity, a methodologically secure, rationally grounded science, individual liberty, might also reflect a dangerously naive optimism, merely class-based interests, might represent or presuppose disguised forms of repression, or might contribute to a stultifying, boring, even a pointless life." As a result of this crisis, there has been a split between reason and sensibility, knowledge and belief, truth and value, science and philosophy, which in turn has led to a sociocultural schism and an increasing atomization of human beings. This also reflects on one's understanding of conception of man. The man is regarded as an object from which reason and sensibility, soul and body, religious faith and scientific knowledge

want to be completely separated. The man as a whole disappears and is replaced by a being characterized by fragmentation. In this sense, the emergence of phenomenology had a great impact not only on the paradigm of epistemological research, but also on the transformation of the concept of the man and related ideas. As a result, the notion of intentionality has also had a prominent impact on the transformation of the understanding of the concept of the man.

Although Husserl did not directly and clearly describe his views related to the concept of the human being, nor did he write works to study this topic, it is still possible to distill and summarize his views on the concept of the man from his phenomenological works. The concept of intentionality is the entry point for summarizing his views. When Zahavi (2003, p. 17) mentioned the value of this term, he said, "Why was the topic deemed to be of crucial importance? Because its investigation allowed for a clarification of the connection as well as of the difference between experiential subjectivity and worldly objects." The concept of intentionality highlights the status of human subjectivity while not ignoring the epistemological status of the object as traditional egoism does. The concept's basic understanding of the man is to see the human being as a constitutive being who constructs the world in the process of knowing it, while at the same time constituting the being of the ego. Rather than being a passive part of nature, the existence of man is constantly constructing the external world through intentionality, while at the same time constantly constructing the internal world. External objects are always presented from a certain perspective or aspect in one's vision or experience, and one is always co-intendent to be part of the absent and part of the present. From the perspective of intentionality, Husserl conceptualizes man as a kind of "constructive being". In the process of recognizing and experiencing the world, the man is constantly and actively constructing and building the phenomena of the world, and at the same time constructing and shaping his own way of being. The existence of man is a dynamic process of mutual construction of the internal and external worlds.

In addition, the value of man will not disappear because of the dissolution of subjectivity by science; the man still has corresponding subjective value. While objectivism and scientism may attempt to dissolve

subjectivity, Husserl argues that the value of the man subject does not disappear as a result. On the contrary, the phenomenological view reveals the importance of man's subjectivity and its intrinsic value. The man is not only the subject who constructs the world, but also the source that gives meaning and value to the world. As intentional beings, man's experience of the world is meaningful and valuable. One's perception, thinking, emotion and other intentional behaviors all contain unique qualities of experience and value orientation. The richness and value of this subjective experience cannot be fully grasped by the scientific objectification method. Therefore, although science pursues objectivity and regularity, the value of the subject is rooted in one's experience of the living world. The value of phenomenology is to reopen the investigation of the meaning of this root, so that the subjectivity of man and the related value can be reproduced. The existence of man is not only constructive, but also contains an irreplaceable subjective value, which is the source of intentionality of worldly objects.

Lifeworld and Man

As it mentioned before, phenomenology inaugurated by Husserl attempts "to back to things themselves". As a result, there is a crucial technical term lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*), which signifies a pre-scientific world and aims at returning to a lived world free from mathematical scientific concepts or frameworks. Zahavi (2003, p. 125) said, "Husserl's analysis of the lifeworld (the prescientific world of experience) constitutes one of his best-known investigations and is among those that have found widest acceptance outside of phenomenology—for instance, in parts of sociology." The term is related to the conception of man as well, and it will be discussed in detail below. As the development of sciences in 20th century, there is gradually a set of pursuits to the strict precision and related objective knowledge. Natural sciences prerequisite that the world is predictable and reducible, and the physical objects run under precise and strict laws. The objects can be reduced to particles and the world can be regarded as a machine, and at some time the state of motion can be calculated by mathematical sciences. Even the state of the universe at a certain point in time can be calculated and predicted. The entire world is studied and understood in conditions of rigid mathematical scientific concepts and frameworks by modern scientists.

Related paradigm of thinking about working of worldly objects or nature of man is constructed under these conditions. Thus, it seems that there is a third-party vision beyond the subject is observing and studying the world and arriving at relevant so-called objective knowledge. This vision brings about the obsession with the strict precision and certainty when scientists attempt to understand the working of all things.

However, Husserl deems that there is a crisis taken place in modern sciences and supposes that a new paradigm about the appreciation of the world should be constructed. Husserl (1970, p. 5) said, "It may be, however, that motives arise from another direction of inquiry—that of the general lament about the crisis of our culture and the role here ascribed to the sciences—for subjecting the scientific character of all sciences to a serious and quiet necessary critique without sacrificing their primary sense of scientific discipline, so unimpeachable within the legitimacy of their methodic accomplishments." From his views, mathematical sciences prerequisite an ideal framework and related concept imposed into the lived world and ignore the significance of ambiguity or incompleteness of corresponding world. Mathematical sciences fail to reveal the richness, complexity, and ambiguity of the world. So much so that it has left the picture of the world full of mechanics and a series of rigid concepts that have been imposed. Much of modern science is based on abstractions and conceptualizations of the world and moving objects, and many theories presuppose some perfect conceptual setting. For example, the classical mechanics setting of absolutely smooth surfaces, no friction, and no air resistance. These settings are the settings of a mind that exist in a conceptualization of the motion and state of objects in an ideal state, and the associated knowledge that arises is based on this set of paradigms. From this, Husserl proposed a return to the lifeworld, to things themselves, to their richness, complexity and irreducible ambiguity.

The lifeworld emphasizes the fine-grained experience and perception of the world and its objects in different perspectives and situations, with the man as the subject of observation. This is a pre-scientific attitude of empathy and return to the integrity of the world, an emphasis on the living world, and an all-encompassing enhancement of human subjectivity. Additionally,

phenomenology doesn't merely claim that precise sciences are based on the lived world; it also endeavors to characterize the distinct types of intentionality that underpin these sciences. It aims to clearly delineate how the lifeworld is converted into the realm of geometric and atomic realities. Husserl (1970, p. 221) mentioned that "It is thus clear—and we have already pointed this out—that nature, in exact natural science, is not the actually experienced nature, that of the lifeworld. It is an idea that has risen out of idealization has been hypothetically substituted for actually intuited nature." Thus, phenomenology demonstrates that the exact sciences are contingent upon the lived world and its contents. It acknowledges the significance and uniqueness of modern mathematical science without overestimating them; it points out that such sciences are founded on elements presented to us in a non-scientific manner.

It also emphasizes that science is ultimately possessed or realized by individuals. Scientists, as human beings, engage in the specific modes of thought and intention required by scientific inquiry. Science encompasses various forms of intentionality, involving different types of presence, absence, and identity synthesis. It relies on certain types of intentionality shared with other intellectual activities, while also cultivating unique forms of its own. However, it remains anchored to the individuals, the transcendental egos, who actualize science. Zahavi (2003, p. 133) mentioned that "Husserl's central argument against scientific objectivism is, consequently, transcendental in nature. It is not only perceptually given objects that are intentionally correlated, but this is also true for theoretical idealities. The latter are also constituted intentional objects that only acquire full intelligibility when they are investigated in correlation to transcendental (inter) subjectivity." As mentioned earlier, the notion of the lifeworld as a humanly constituted, lifeworld challenges Descartes' view of the human subject as a separate, isolated mind or consciousness separate from the world, challenges the Cartesian view of the human subject as a separate, isolated mind or consciousness, challenges the Cartesian view of the human subject as a separate, isolated mind or consciousness separate from the world. Instead, it argues that human existence is always already immersed in a meaningful world of shared experiences, practices, and cultural contexts. At the same time, the intersubjectivity of man unfolds in the lifeworld and

is in a state of constructing and being constructed with it. The relationship between intersubjectivity of man and the lifeworld will be described next.

The term "intersubjectivity" challenges the idea of the subject as an isolated, self-contained individual. Instead, it views the subject as always already embedded in an intersubjective world of meanings, practices, and relationships with others. Our experiences and understandings are shaped through interactions and encounters with other subjects within the shared lifeworld. We co-constitute meanings intersubjectively through communication, language, and shared cultural practices. Zahavi (2003, p. 109) said, "Husserl considered intersubjectivity to be a topic of immense importance, and, from a purely quantitative point of view, he devoted more pages to this issue than any of the later phenomenologists." Moreover, Husserl's phenomenological investigation of intersubjectivity is an analysis of the transcendental or constitutive function of intersubjectivity. The aim of his reflections is to formulate a theory of transcendental intersubjectivity, rather than to provide a detailed examination of the concrete sociality or the specific I-Thou relation. The concept of intersubjectivity posits the possibility of mutual understanding and a common ground of shared experiences despite individual perspectival differences. It acknowledges that our self-understanding and grasp of phenomena are mediated by the intersubjective contexts, traditions, and horizons of meaning that we inherit and participate in. It serves as the foundation for objectivity in the phenomenological sense. This is because objective meanings and understandings emerge through intersubjective validation and negotiation within the lifeworld.

Husserl's concept of intersubjectivity is, in fact, a concept of inter-subjectivity, that is, the relation between subjects. Consequently, it implies an examination of empathy—how can I experience another subject? According to the phenomenological approach, intersubjectivity cannot be adequately examined from a third-person perspective but must be analyzed in its experiential manifestation from a first-person perspective. As Husserl (1970) mentioned intersubjectivity can only be treated as a transcendental problem through a radical "self-questioning;" only my experience of and relation to another subject, as well as those of my experiences that

presuppose the other, truly merit the name "intersubjective." Thus, based on this view, intersubjectivity is constantly at work not only in the lived world, but also among living men. The earthly and living character of the human being constitutes yet another element of Husserl's conception of man. This perspective suggests that intersubjectivity is not only a constant feature of the lifeworld, but also a fundamental aspect of human existence. The being-in-the-world nature of human beings and their embodied character constitute another aspect of Husserl's conception of the man.

According to Husserl's phenomenology, we can expand on this as follows: existence is fundamentally characterized by its being embedded in the intersubjective lifeworld. We do not exist as isolated, self-contained individuals; rather, we are always already immersed in a shared world of meanings, practices, and relationships with others. Our lived experiences are shaped by this intersubjective context, which provides the horizons of understanding within which we make sense of phenomena. Furthermore, human beings are not abstract, disembodied subjects; rather, they are living, flesh-and-blood beings whose mode of being is inextricably tied to their corporeal, lived bodily existence. Our consciousness and experiences are grounded in and mediated through our embodied being-in-the-world. The lived body is the locus of our primordial experience and the means through which we engage with and inhabit the intersubjective lifeworld. This living, embodied nature of human existence implies that we are not detached observers of the world but are always already practically and affectively involved with the world and others within it. Our understanding emerges through our engaged, lived involvements within the intersubjective contexts we find ourselves in. Thus, for Husserl, the man is neither a disembodied, isolated ego nor a mere object in the world. Rather, it is a living, embodied subjectivity that is fundamentally constituted through its being immersed in and engaged with the intersubjective lifeworld. The phenomenological conception of the human being posits that our being-in-the-world and lived, embodied character are essential aspects of what it means to be human.

CONCLUSION

According to Husserl's phenomenological thought, we can understand his concept of man in this way: The man is a complex being with multiple dimensions. First of all, the man has intentionality and are a "constructive being" who recognize and experience reality by constantly constructing the external world and the internal world. Secondly, the man has subjective values that cannot be fully grasped by scientific methods. A man not only constructs the world, but also gives the world meaning. Husserl emphasized the concept of "lifeworld" and advocated returning to pre-scientific direct experience to enhance human subjectivity. At the same time, a man is not an isolated individual but is embedded in a shared world of meaning through inter-subjectivity and interact with others to form understanding and experience. In addition, human existence is physical, and consciousness and experience are rooted in physical existence. Finally, man's way of being is practical and emotional, deeply involved in the world and other people. In short, according to Husserl, the man is a dynamic, multi-dimensional being who constantly constructs the meaning of himself and the world through interaction with the world and others.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

REFERENCES

Berry, C. J. (1986). *Human nature*. Humanities Press International.

Bernet, R., Kern, I., & Marbach, E. (1993). *An introduction to Husserlian phenomenology*. Northwestern University Press.

Boer, T. de. (1978). *The development of Husserl's thought*. Martinus Nijhoff.

Brown, D. (1991). *Human universals*. McGraw-Hill.

Chomsky, N., & Foucault, M. (2006). *The Chomsky-Foucault debate: On human nature*. New Press.

Cozolino, L. J. (2006). *The neuroscience of human relationships*. Norton.

Dawkins, R. (1976). *The selfish gene*. Oxford University Press.

Dennett, D. C. (1982). How to study human consciousness empirically, or nothing comes to mind. *Synthese*, *53*, 159–180.

Dreyfus, H. L. (1982). Husserl's perceptual noema. In H. L. Dreyfus & H. Hall (Eds.), *Husserl, intentionality and cognitive science* (pp. 97–123). MIT Press.

Dreyfus, H. L., & Hall, H. (1982). Introduction. In H. L. Dreyfus & H. Hall (Eds.), *Husserl, intentionality and cognitive science* (pp. 1–27). MIT Press.

Epictetus. (1925). *The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments* (W. A. Oldfather, Trans.; Vol. 1). Harvard University Press.

Fink, E. (1981). The problem of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (R. M. Harlan, Trans.). In W. McKenna, R. M. Harlan, & L. E. Winters (Eds.), *Apriori and world: European contributions to Husserlian phenomenology* (pp. 21–55). Martinus Nijhoff. (Original work published 1939)

Fink, E. (2000). The phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl and contemporary criticism (R. O. Elveton, Trans.). In R. O. Elveton (Ed.), *The phenomenology of Husserl: Selected critical readings* (2nd ed., pp. 70–139). Noesis Press. (Original work published 1933)

Gaus, G. F. (1982). *The modern liberal theory of man*. Croom Helm.

Hampshire, S. (1965). *Thought and action*. Chatto & Windus.

Harris, J. F. (2012). *The ascent of man: A philosophy of human nature*. Transaction Publishers.

Heidegger, M. (1996). *Being and time* (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). State University of New York Press. (Original work published 1927)

Hopp, W. (2020). *Phenomenology: A contemporary introduction*. Routledge.

Howells, C. (Ed.). (2006). *The Cambridge companion to Sartre*. Cambridge University Press.

Hume, D. (2000). *A treatise of human nature* (D. F. Norton & M. J. Norton, Eds.). Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1739)

Hursthouse, R. (1987). *Beginning lives*. Basil Blackwell.

Husserl, E. (1970). *The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology: An introduction to phenomenological philosophy* (D. Carr, Trans.). Northwestern University Press.

Husserl, E. (1989). *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: Second book: Studies in the phenomenology of constitution* (R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, Trans.). Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Husserl, E. (2001). *Logical investigations* (J. N. Findlay, Trans.; D. Moran, Ed.). Routledge.

Husserl, E. (2014). *Ideas for a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy: First book: General introduction to pure phenomenology.* Hackett Publishing Company.

Kant, I. (1998). *Critique of pure reason* (P. Guyer & A. W. Wood, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1781)

Kronfeldner, M. (2018). *What's left of human nature? A post-essentialist, pluralist, and interactive account of a contested concept.* The MIT Press.

Langford, P. (1986). *Modern philosophies of human nature: Their emergence from Christian thought.* Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Levinas, E. (1969). *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority* (A. Lingis, Trans.). Duquesne University Press.

Locke, J. (2008). *An essay concerning human understanding* (P. H. Nidditch, Ed.). Oxford University Press.

Macann, C. (1993). *Four phenomenological philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty.* Routledge.

Marx, K. (1844). Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844. In K. Marx & F. Engels (Eds.), *Collected works* (Vol. 3, p. 276). Progress Publishers.

Marx, K. (1845–1846). The German ideology. In K. Marx & F. Engels (Eds.), *Collected works* (Vol. 5, p. 31). Progress Publishers.

McKay, N. (1989). *Motivation and explanation: An essay on Freud's philosophy of science.* International Universities Press.

McKee, A. (2003). *Textual analysis: A beginner's guide.* SAGE Publications.

Merkur, D. (2010). *Explorations of the psychoanalytic mystics.* Rodopi.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). *The primacy of perception: And other essays on phenomenological psychology, the philosophy of art, history, and politics* (J. M. Edie, Trans.). Northwestern University Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1968). *The visible and the invisible* (A. Lingis, Trans.). Northwestern University Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). *Phenomenology of perception* (D. A. Landes, Trans.). Routledge. (Original work published 1945)

Midgley, M. (1978). *Beast and man*. Harvester.

Moran, D. (2002). *Introduction to phenomenology*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203197462

Olson, E. T. (2014). Personal identity. In S. Luper (Ed.), *The Cambridge companion to life and death* (pp. 30–46). Cambridge University Press.

Olson, E. T. (2019). Personal identity. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/

Pinker, S. (2002). *The blank slate: The modern denial of human nature*. Penguin Books.

Pippin, R. B. (1999). *Modernism as a philosophical problem: on the dissatisfactions of European high culture*. Blackwell Publishers.

Richards, J. R. (2000). *Human nature after Darwin: A philosophical introduction*. Routledge.

Rinofner-Kreidl, S. (2012). Moral philosophy. In S. Luft & S. Overgaard (Eds.), *The Routledge companion to phenomenology* (pp. 417–426). Routledge.

Rosen, S. H. (1997). Human nature and the founding of philosophy. In L. S. Rouner (Ed.), *Is there a human nature?* (pp. 31-50). University of Notre Dame Press.

Sartre, J.-P. (2004). *Critique of dialectical reason: Volume 1 theory of practical ensembles* (A. Sheridan-Smith, Trans.; J. Rée, Ed.; F. Jameson, Foreword). Verso. (Original work published 1960)

Sartre, J.-P. (2007). *Existentialism is a humanism* (C. Macomber, Trans.). Yale University Press.

Sartre, J.-P. (2018). *Being and nothingness: An essay in phenomenological ontology* (S. Richmond, Trans.). Routledge. (Original work published 1943)

Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2009). *Research methods for business students* (5th ed.). Pearson Education Limited.

Schaar, J. H. (1961). Escape from authority: The perspectives of Erich

Fromm. *The American Political Science Review*, *55*(2), 243–255.

Schechtman, M. (1996). *The constitution of selves*. Cornell University Press.

Scruton, R. (2017). *On human nature*. Princeton University Press.

Smith, D. W. (2013). Phenomenology. *Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/

Sokolowski, R. (2000). *Introduction to phenomenology*. Cambridge University Press.

Stevenson, L., Haberman, D. L., Wright, P. M., & Witt, C. (2018). *Thirteen theories of human nature* (7th ed.). Oxford University Press.Smith, A. D. (2003). *Routledge philosophy guidebook to Husserl and the Cartesian meditations*. Routledge.

Smith, D. W. (2013). *Husserl* (2nd ed.). Routledge.

Smith, D. W. & McIntyre, R. (1982). *Husserl and intentionality*. D. Reidel.

Zahavi, D. (2003). *Husserl's phenomenology*. Stanford University Press.

Zahavi, D. (2019). *Phenomenology: The basics*. Routledge.