ISLAMIC INHERITANCE DISTRIBUTION AND THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: A CONCEPTUAL STUDY

Abstract

Disputes among heirs in Islamic inheritance distribution can lead to prolonged legal processes, emotional strain, and financial losses, rendering the estate economically inefficient. To better understand the behavioural dimensions underlying such conflicts, this paper proposes a conceptual application of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) to explore the strategic interactions between heirs and how their choices either to cooperate or defect affect inheritance outcomes. The model is applied to both male–male and male–female heir scenarios. In male–male interactions, mutual cooperation typically results in a balanced and efficient distribution. However, if one heir defects in pursuit of a greater share, it may trigger retaliation, leading to escalating conflict, litigation, and delayed resolution despite eventual redistribution. In male–female dynamics, structural differences in faraid allocations, where males receive twice the share of females, can lead to perceived inequities. While female heirs may be inclined to defect for a more equitable outcome, male heirs may sometimes respond with empathy or voluntary compromise. Yet, mutual defection results in costly, time-consuming disputes that harm both parties. This study contributes to the theoretical extension of the PD by applying it within the context of Islamic inheritance practice. It also highlights the critical role of inheritance agencies in fostering awareness, mediation, and cooperation to ensure timely and fair wealth distribution in accordance with Islamic principles.