BIBLIOMETRIC ANALYSIS ON THE RESEARCH ON LOCAL OFFICIALS IN CHINA BASED ON CITE SPACE

XiaBing Le; Sarma Aralas

doi:10.51200/mjbe.v12i2.7168

Authors

XiaBing Le
Sarma Aralas

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51200/mjbe.v12i2.7168

Keywords:

Local Officials, China, CiteSpace, Research Hotspots, Visualization Analysis

Abstract

Local officials, acting as dual agents who embody both state and social roles, constitute a crucial element in local governance. Based on the literature about Chinese local officials within the WOS database from 2001 to 2023, this current paper employs CiteSpace 6.2.R6 software to analyze the number of publications, research countries, research institutions, and keywords in this field. The results reveal that the number of publications has increased significantly since 2018. Both China and the United States exhibit a substantial lead in the number of published articles. Most of the publishing institutions are top universities in China, with Peking University, Renmin University of China, and Fudan University ranking in the top three. The keyword analysis of the literature discloses that the current research hotspots of Chinese local officials mainly focus on official promotion, economic performance, official turnover, and environmental governance. Furthermore, the relationship between officials and environmental governance emerges as a prospective research trend. Visualizing the research hotspots of Chinese local officials and comprehensively summarizing the research progress in this field can serve as a valuable reference for scholars to enhance future research in this field.

Author Biographies

XiaBing Le

Faculty of Business, Economics and Accountancy

University Malaysia Sabah, Jalan UMS 88400 Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia

Sarma Aralas

Faculty of Business, Economics and Accountancy

University Malaysia Sabah, Jalan UMS 88400 Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia

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